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MONETARY UNION AND CENTRAL BANK  
INDEPENDENCE 
 
 
1. Introduction 
The decision to enter a monetary union can bring important economic benefits as well as 
costs for the member countries. Starting with Mundell (1961), the literature has identified the 
restricted ability of member countries to react to negative economic shocks as the main cost of 
monetary unions. In a monetary union, monetary and exchange rate policies are decided at the 
union level and may not always be in line with the current needs of each member country. This is 
particularly problematic if the member countries have dissimilar business cycles and if wage 
rigidity and restricted labor mobility hamper macroeconomic adjustment. On the benefits side, 
monetary unions eliminate exchange rate uncertainty and the currency conversions costs among 
the member states, which may spur international trade and investment. An important benefit that 
has dominated the recent literature is the credibility argument. Monetary unions create the 
potential for some countries to “import monetary credibility” from other member countries with 
reputation for prudent monetary policy, e.g. Germany in the euro-zone (Herrendorf 1997). Time 
wise this is a more efficient way to improve credibility than earning it through the alternative 
time consuming way of building a track record (Blinder 2000). 
In this paper we show that a monetary union can enhance monetary stability for its 
member states even if none of them have a history of prudent monetary policy. This is important 
because a number of monetary unions have been proposed among groups of developing 
countries that lack a history of stable prices or simply have a short history of independent 
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monetary policy.1 Some authors, e.g. Mundell (2002), have argued that monetary unions could 
provide a means for credible commitment to sound macroeconomic policies. For example, 
Guillaume and Stasavage (2000) provide evidence that African countries that participate in 
monetary unions tend to pursue more credible monetary policies. 
We develop a Barro and Gordon (1983) type model where the preferences of the central 
banks of a group of countries considering monetary union are state contingent and thus not 
known to policy makers a priori as in Demertzis and Hallett (2004). This could arise from lack of 
independence such that the central banks may be pressured to accommodate government 
objectives in terms of output (Demertzis and Hallett 2003). In addition, political patronage for 
particular members of management may shift over time affecting their influence on policy. In the 
developing countries these fears are ever present. Given the weak checks on the government, the 
uncertainty about the preferences of policymakers is expected to be higher in these countries. In 
this context, we show that shifting the conduct of monetary policy from the national level to a 
union level in a multilateral union decreases the variability of union-level inflation and improves 
welfare as long as the central banks of the member countries experience different pressures to 
inflate at different times. In the model, the opportunistic objectives of one member’s 
policymakers are kept in check at the union level by other members with disparate objectives. 
Our theoretical analysis extends a growing literature on the monetary and fiscal policy 
interactions of member states in a monetary union. Debrun et al. (2005) analyze the implications 
of financing needs using a theoretical framework that includes fiscal policy. Beetsma and 
Bovenberg (1999) explore how monetary unification impacts the accumulation of public debt 
and show that under fiscal leadership it may discipline fiscal and monetary policy, while Dixit 
                                                          
1 Examples are the proposed East African Community (EAC) monetary union and the Southern Africa Development 
Community (SADC) currency union.  
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and Lambertini (2003) explore the interaction of a centralized monetary policy with 
decentralized fiscal policy. They show that when monetary and fiscal authorities in a monetary 
union agree on the ideal output and inflation levels, ideal outcomes emerge as the equilibrium 
without the need for monetary commitment. Our analysis of the effect of asymmetry of central 
bank preferences in a monetary union is new to the literature.  
As an application to the theory, we investigate the feasibility of monetary union in the 
East African Community. The three member countries: Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda, recently 
signed a customs union treaty and have officially declared their goal to form a currency union. 
Two neighboring countries, Rwanda and Burundi, have indicated an interest to join and are 
included in the analysis. None of the five countries has a long or particularly successful history 
of monetary policy. Thus, their experience fits neatly our theoretical model. We parameterize the 
model to provide a welfare analysis for this monetary union based on a tradeoff between the loss 
of independent monetary policy and the gain from checks on monetary policy provided by 
member states. In this sense, we also extend a small but growing literature on monetary unions in 
Africa, e.g. Masson and Pattillo (2005), Honohan and Lane (2000), Khamfula and Huizinga 
(2004) and Buigut and Valev (2005) among others.  
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 discusses the model and Section 3 
assesses the effects on monetary union. In section 4 we apply the model to estimate the expected 
welfare effects of the proposed East African currency union. Section 5 presents the results of the 
analysis and Section 6 concludes.  
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2. Model 
We assume a n country economic area where countries differ by the size of their GDP, 
the random supply shocks affecting output and their preferences for output stimulation. Output yi 
(all variables in logarithms) in country i  differs from its natural level by an amount determined 
by the difference between actual and expected inflation and an output shock:  
( ) , 1,....,ei i i i iy y b i nπ π ε= + − + =                                                                                     (1) 
The unexpected inflation ( eii ππ − ) affects activity with 0>b  as the marginal output gain 
from unexpected inflation; iε  is an output supply shock with mean zero and finite variance 2iεσ . 
The central bank sets inflation to maximizes the following quasi-linear utility function as in 
Debrun et al. (2005) and Muscatelli (1998): 
2)](~[
2
1)( iiiiiii yycW εππ −−−=                                                                                      (2) 
The parameter ic  in (2) is the weight placed by the central bank on its objective to 
stimulate output above the natural level of output. A greater value of ic  indicates stronger 
preferences for stimulating output and less aversion to high inflation. These preferences are 
subject to shocks (such as unexpected pressures from the executive branch), i.e. i i ic c v= +  where 
iv  is a random variable with mean zero and variance
2
ic
σ . Hence, there are two sources of 
uncertainty in the model: the shocks to output and the shocks to the decision making of the 
central bank. The shocks to preferences are assumed not correlated with the supply shocks within 
and across countries. The private sector forms expectations of inflation etπ  before the stochastic 
shocks are realized and the central bank sets inflation after the shocks are realized. 
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The second term in (2) shows that deviations of inflation from the ideal level ( )i iπ ε% are 
increasingly costly. Linearity of the objective function (2) in output generally implies no role for 
stabilization policy. We restore an implicit trade-off between the variability of inflation and 
output as in Muscatelli (1998) and Debrun et al. (2005) by making the socially optimal level of 
inflation a function of the supply shock: 0,)( >−= ηηεεπ ii . A negative supply shock induces 
the policymaker to tolerate positive inflation.  
 
2.1 Optimal inflation under monetary autonomy 
With autonomous monetary policies, policymakers independently choose inflation rates 
*
iπ by maximizing (2) subject to (1). The time-consistent inflation policy is derived under 
rational expectations assuming, as noted earlier, that expected inflation is formed before the 
shocks iε  and iν  are realized whereas the central bank sets inflation after the shocks are 
realized. However, once the shocks occur they are perfectly observable by all. The solution for 
optimal inflation2 yields: 
iiiii bcbc ηεεππ −=+= )(~*                                                                                                (3) 
The optimal inflation rate increases in the central bank’s preference for stimulating output (ci), in 
the marginal effect of unexpected inflation on output (b) and in the size of the output shock ( iε ). 
Knowing the central bank’s optimization problem, the rationally expected inflation rate is given 
by bci .  
 
                                                          
2 Both iε  and iν are stochastic and not correlated. Since it is assumed that these shocks are observable by both the 
CB and agents once they occur the set up used here reduces to a one period model, where each period the CB 
optimizes based on current shocks. We would require a multi-period set up if either or both of the shocks were only 
observable by the CB.  
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2.2 Optimal inflation under monetary union 
Now, suppose that monetary policy is decided by a common central bank (CCB) in a 
multilateral monetary union of the n countries. The common central bank maximizes a weighted 
average of the individual policymakers’ utility functions: 
1
,
n
CCB
i i
i
U wU
=
=∑                                                                                                                  (4) 
where 0>iw  and 
1
 1
n
i
i
w
=
=∑  is the weight given to country i in the decision-making of the 
common central bank. We can rewrite (4) as:  
2)](~[
2
1)( AAAAA
CCB yycU εππ −−−= ,                                                                             (4′) 
where subscript A  indicates cross country −w weighted averages. To isolate the pure effects of 
monetary unification on policy outcomes it is assumed that the CCB is under the same pressures 
as a national central bank would be, except that in a monetary union individual pressures on the 
CCB are diluted according to the weight of the country in the joint decision process.3 The time 
consistent optimal inflation values under monetary union are found by maximizing (4) to 
obtain *muπ : 
)(~* AAmu bc εππ +=                                                                                                            (5) 
The optimal inflation under monetary union is a function of the weighted output 
preferences of its members and the weighted supply shocks.       
 
 
                                                          
3 This differs from the literature, e.g. Alesina and Barro (2002) and Alesina  et al. (2002), that analyzes a monetary 
union as a process of dollarization in which the inflation prone country adopts the currency of the anchor country in 
a client-anchor relationship. 
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3.  Welfare Effects of Monetary Union  
The net welfare effect of moving from autonomous monetary policy to monetary union 
can be derived from the optimal inflation solutions obtained under autonomy and monetary 
union in (3) and (5). The expected net welfare ( NW ) effect of monetary integration for country 
i  is obtained from: 
autonomyimuii EUEUNWE −=)(                                                                                         (6) 
The workings for (6) are provided in appendix A. By bringing together equations (A5) and (A8) 
we obtain: 
[ ]
iiii ccciicicii
wwwwbNWE −− −+−+−−= σσρσσ )1(2)1()1(2)(
2222
2
 
    
2 2
2 2(1 ) [ 2 ]
2 i i i i
iw
ε ε ε ε ε
η σ σ ρ σ σ− −−− + −   
   [ ] [ ]2222
2
)1(
)1( ii
i
iiii cc
wbcccbw −−−−−− −−                                          (7)  
where subscript –i indicates a w-weighted average of all countries in the union excluding country 
i. Note that 
ii cccii
cc −=− σσρ),cov(  with 1 1cρ− ≤ ≤  being the coefficient of correlation of the 
central bank preferences across countries. Similarly,
iiii −=− εεε σσρεε ),cov( where  1 1ερ− ≤ ≤  
is the correlation coefficient of the supply shocks across countries. A positive value for (7) 
means that welfare for country i  is enhanced in a monetary union. 
The first and second lines in (7) account for the stochastic components of the net welfare 
function. The first line of (7) shows the effects of the uncertainty associated with the 
policymakers’ preferences for stimulating output. The key result regarding this part of the net 
welfare function is the effect of the correlation of these preferences across countries: 
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0)1()( 2 <−−=∂
∂
−ii ccii
c
wwbNWE σσρ                                                                                (8) 
Expression (8) shows that the net benefit of a monetary union decreases in the correlation 
of the shocks to preferences. Intuitively, asymmetry of the shocks to output preferences across 
the member states allows the common central bank to achieve a lower variance of the union-
wide inflation. The pressure to inflate and stimulate output (irrespective of output shocks) in 
some countries is counterbalanced by the desire for a more prudent policy of stable prices in 
other member countries at the same time. Furthermore, note from (8) that this benefit of checks 
by other member states is particularly strong if the individual central banks tend to experience 
large shocks to their objectives, i.e. if the cσ ’s are large.  
The second line of (7) shows the loss of welfare resulting from the reduced ability of 
individual central banks to react to economic shocks. This line is unambiguously negative, and is 
zero only if 22
ii −= εε σσ  and 1=ερ , i.e. if the countries face the same shocks. This is the typical 
cost associated with monetary unions. Note that from (7): 
0)1()( 22 >−=∂
∂
−iiiw
NWE
εε
ε
σσηρ                                                  (9) 
i.e. the greater the correlation of output shocks across countries, the smaller is the cost associated 
with the loss of independent monetary policy. From (9), the synchronicity of supply shocks is 
particularly important if the member countries are prone to experience large shocks, i.e. if the 
εσ ’s are large.4  
                                                          
4 The effects of the correlations of supply shocks and preference shocks become even clearer if we consider a 
simplified case of two countries of equal weight, with 2 2 2
i iε ε εσ σ σ−= = ,
2 2 2
i ic c c
σ σ σ
−
= =  and i ic c−= . 
Then, ( ) ( ) ( )2 2 2 21 4 1 1i c cE NW b ε εσ ρ η σ ρ⎡ ⎤⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦= − − − .  It is apparent that expected net welfare increases in ερ  and decreases 
in cρ . 
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The third line of (7) shows the nonstochastic component of the net welfare function. This 
line is composed of two parts. The first part is positive when 0<−− ii cc , implying that welfare 
increases for a country if it enters into monetary union with countries having greater aversion to 
high inflation. Thus, this part of the welfare function captures the benefits of imported monetary 
credibility: 
0])1([
)1()( 2 <+−−−=∂
∂
−
−
iiii
i
i
cwwc
a
bw
c
NWE                                                   (10) 
The second part of the third line in (7), which is always negative, shows the loss from diverging 
output preferences in a monetary union. The greater the difference between the expected output 
preferences of country i  and that of partner countries the greater the loss. Note also that the third 
line in (7) is zero when the expected output preferences of country i are the same as in the rest of 
the union, i.e. when ii cc =− .  
In summary, the net gain from monetary union for country i is greater if it joins in a 
union with other countries that have stronger expected preferences for low inflation (the 
imported credibility argument); if its output shocks are more highly correlated with those of the 
other union members; and if the shocks to its central bank’s preferences are correlated less with 
those of other member countries. The literature discusses the first and second of these effects, but 
has not identified the third one. Yet, it is an important effect because it shows that gains in 
monetary credibility are possible by forming a multilateral monetary union even if all of the 
member countries’ central banks face pressures to inflate provided that these pressures do not 
occur at the same time.  
The following sections use the model developed here to study the expected net benefits 
from forming a currency union for the East African countries. This group of countries is an ideal 
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choice for study since they have made a significant effort towards monetary union. Given that 
none of these countries has a long history of independent monetary policy their experience fits 
our theoretical model well. 
 
4.  Welfare Effects of an East African Monetary Union: An Application 
In this section we estimate the welfare effects of a move to monetary union for five East 
African countries: Burundi, Kenya, Rwanda, Tanzania, and Uganda. To derive estimates of the 
parameters ic andb  in (7), we adapt the approach in Swank (1997) to our welfare framework.
5 In 
Swank’s model, the policy maker chooses nominal output to balance the objectives of low 
inflation and high output subject to a constraint based on the short-run Phillips curve (Ball et al. 
1988). The reaction function derived from this optimization problem contains information about 
both the policy maker’s preferences and the economic constraint. To disentangle this 
information, the Phillips curve is first estimated and then the reaction function is estimated 
making use of the estimates of the Phillips curve. We adapt this method to the loss function in 
(2) to estimate the preferences parameter ic  and the marginal output gain from unexpected 
inflationb . The procedure is described in appendix B. 
To perform the estimations we use data on real and nominal GDP from the World Bank’s 
World Development Indicators and the IMF’s International Financial Statistics. The length of 
the data series, covering the period from 1990 onward, was kept short deliberately to capture 
relatively more recent developments in the five countries.6 We start obtaining regression results 
                                                          
5 Only a few other studies have developed methods to derive the preference parameter ( ic ), e.g. Krause and Mendez 
(2005), Cecchetti et al. (2002), and Favero and Rovelli (2003).  
6 The prolonged civil war in Uganda until the late 1980’s makes these data unreliable around this period. Also in the 
80’s, Tanzania underwent transition from a socialist regime to a market economy. Furthermore, the three EAC 
countries have steadily moved from high inflation regimes in the late 1980’s towards lower inflation through the 
nineties.  
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for the sub-sample covering the period up to 2000. Then these are rolled, one year at a time, to 
obtain a series for the trade-off and preference parameters. For example, the first regression for 
Kenya covers the sub-period 1990-2000, the second regression 1991-2001, and so forth. These 
rolling regression results are used to obtain the variances and covariances for the preferences 
parameter. 
Next, with the same data series we identify the output shocks faced by the East Africa 
countries using the approach in Bayoumi and Ostry (1997). In particular, we regress the growth 
of real output (in logs) on its two lags. The residuals from this regression are taken to represent 
the underlying output disturbances.7 This allows us to estimate the variances 2 2and
i iε εσ σ − and the 
covariance ),cov( ii −εε of the shocks for each country. Finally, the weights ( iw ) are obtained 
from a four year average (from 2000-2003) of the real GDP in US dollars. We also try out 
alternative weights such as equal weighting of all member countries.   
 
5.   Results 
Table 1 shows the summary results for the various coefficients required to estimate the 
net welfare (7) for each of the five countries. The table lists results for two scenarios. The first 
case is when the three core EAC countries (Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda) form a monetary 
union on their own and the second scenario is when all the five EA countries join in the union.   
The first row of Table 1 shows the estimated values for the marginal output gain from 
unexpected inflation ( b ). These are obtained as in (B7′) of appendix B. The values of b do not 
differ much among the countries ranging from around 0.1 to less than 0.2. The second row of 
                                                          
7 We also use the supply shocks from Buigut and Valev (2005) decomposed using the identification framework of 
Blanchard and Quah (1989) and Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1992). The output shocks obtained from this method 
turn out to be only slightly smaller but otherwise give the same results.     
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Table 1 shows the average output preference parameters ( ic ) for the EA countries. These values 
reflect the weight placed on output stimulation relative to inflation. It is striking how different 
these preferences are among the EA countries. Uganda, and to a lesser extent Tanzania, places 
much higher weight on output relative to inflation compared to the other EA countries. 
Furthermore, row three in Table 1 shows that Uganda and Tanzania exhibit a much greater 
variation of their output preferences compared to the other three countries. The tolerance for high 
inflation (high ic ) along with the high variability of the preferences for inflation (high 
2
ic
σ ) for 
Uganda and Tanzania suggest that these two countries are likely to gain from monetary union 
since they would face less inflation uncertainty in a monetary union than under autonomy.  
The fourth row of Table 1 shows that the output shocks are substantially smaller 
compared to the shocks to preferences for each of the EA countries, i.e. most of the economic 
fluctuations in these countries are the result of policy shocks rather than output shocks. 
Therefore, the benefit of implementing more stable policies in a monetary union may outweigh 
the costs of losing independent monetary policy.8 Looking at the remaining results in Table 1, 
notice that the correlations of the preferences shocks ( cρ ) across the three EAC countries 
(Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda) are positive. However, the covariances ),cov( ii cc −  are not 
particularly large.  For the remaining two countries, Burundi and Rwanda, the correlations of the 
preferences shocks are actually negative. Therefore, overall a monetary union may provide a 
useful instrument for checks on the pressures to raise inflation in individual countries.  
The net welfare effects of a monetary union are presented in Table 2. We give the results 
when only the 3 EAC countries form a monetary union and when all the five EA countries join in 
                                                          
8 Debrun et al. (2005) found that in West Africa differences in the governments’ financing needs dominate the 
welfare function over the supply shocks. This suggests that policy shocks are more important in developing 
countries. A supra-national institution (a common central bank) would therefore be beneficial if designed to promote 
commitment to sound macroeconomic policies. 
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the union. We also show the results of two scenarios regarding the decision making in the union. 
In the first case, the power exercised by each country is proportion to its economic size (GDP). 
In the second case, all countries exercise equal weights in the union.  
The net welfare effect of monetary union differs across the five countries. In all scenarios 
Uganda and Tanzania benefit from the union whereas Kenya, Burundi, and Rwanda seem to lose 
from a monetary union.9 Table 3 provides further insight into these results. The table 
decomposes the net welfare (7) into three effects: the effect of the correlation of the shocks to 
preferences, the effect of the correlation of the shocks to output, and the effect of differences in 
the average output preferences across the countries. Essentially, the table provides the estimated 
numerical values for the three lines in equation (7). Summing up the numbers from one row in 
Table 3 gives the overall net gain in Table 2.10 Decomposing the net welfare allows us to 
investigate which of the effects influence it most strongly. The results are for the case of GDP-
weighted decision making in the monetary union.    
Table 3 shows that the most important factor determining net welfare are the strong 
preferences for output stimulation in Uganda. This shows in the third column of Table 3 where 
the value for Uganda is positive and large indicating that Uganda would benefit from a monetary 
union with countries that display stronger aversion to high inflation. Conversely, most of the 
                                                          
9 Since b is assumed similar across the countries, we use a weighted average of 0.125 for the three EAC countries 
and 0.135 for all the five countries. The results in Table 2 are robust to changes in the values of b andη . Changing 
the value of b has no effect on the signs of the results for the countries that show negative net gain. It only changes 
the magnitude of the loss. However, for Uganda and Tanzania, very small values of b  (less than 0.0024 and 0.0096 
in the three-country case and less than 0.0036 and 0.0076 in the five-country case respectively) turn the positive net 
welfare gain in Table 2 into a negative net gain. Compared to the estimated values of b  (0.098 and 0.133 
respectively) these are quite small. Changing the value of η increases the loss from supply shock asymmetry. 
However, the values of η needed to change the sign for the net gainers is large; greater than 13.1 and 53.1 in the 
three-country case and greater than 17.9 and 37.8 in the five-country case respectively. Finally, increasing the 
weight exercised by a country in the union decreases the net welfare loss for the countries that are net losers, and 
decreases the net gain for the net gainers. 
10 For example, the net gain from monetary union for Uganda is 0.1228 – 0.0001 + 0.2572 (in Table 3) = 0.38 (in 
Table 2). 
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remaining countries would lose from a monetary union with a country that has a relatively poor 
inflationary record.  
Table 3 also highlights the importance of the correlation of the shocks to preferences that 
is the main focus of this paper. Consider the case of Tanzania as an example. If the net benefit 
from a monetary union for Tanzania was determined only considering the cost of losing 
monetary policy (value -0.0001 in the second column of Table 3) and the “imported” credibility 
argument (value -0.0041 in the third column of Table 3) the overall net gain for Tanzania would 
be negative (-0.0001-0.0041 = -0.0042). Adding the consideration of checks on individual 
countries’ policies by the union (value 0.0141 in Table 3) reverses this result into a positive net 
gain of 0.010.11   
 
6. Conclusions 
This paper studies the implications of uncertainty regarding the central banks preferences 
for monetary union. We develop a model where the preferences of the central banks of potential 
member countries in a monetary union are subject to shocks (such as unexpected pressures to 
accommodate government objectives). We find that the net gain from monetary union for a 
country is greater if it joins in a union with other countries that have greater credibility for low 
inflation; if its output shocks are more highly correlated with those of the other union members; 
and if the shocks to its central bank’s preferences are correlated less with those of other member 
countries. The latter result occurs because the supranational central bank is able to even out the 
                                                          
11 Monetary union among the EA countries is not likely to produce a strong currency, and would likely require 
stabilization against major currencies. The euro has been suggested by a number of authors (Honohan and Lane, 
2000; Buigut and Valev, 2005) as the most appropriate currency for an anchor. Though this is not the theme of our 
discussion here we do estimate the welfare effect of anchoring an EA currency to the euro. Our analysis shows that 
the net welfare for all the five countries is positive when the EA currency is linked to the euro. These results are 
available on request.  
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preference shocks across the member countries. While the literature has discussed the first two 
effects, it has not identified the third one.  
We use data from East Africa to calibrate the model and to estimate the expected gains 
from forming a monetary union in the East African Community. Such a union has been proposed 
and steps are being made for its implementation in the near future. Yet, not much economic 
analysis has been carried out to inform these policies. We find that two of the EA countries: 
Tanzania and Uganda will benefit from a monetary union whereas the remaining three countries 
Burundi, Kenya, and Rwanda will lose.  
Clearly, there are additional considerations when discussing the potential benefits of an 
EAC monetary union. Nonetheless, our calibrations serve to highlight the importance of taking 
into account the shocks to central bank preferences when investigating the gains from monetary 
unions among developing countries. The model presented here or an expanded version that 
includes, for example, fiscal policy or multiple periods can be applied to other groupings of 
developing countries that have considered monetary union in other parts of Africa such as the 
SADC, in Latin America (MERCOSUR), or the transition countries of Eastern Europe.   
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TECHNICAL APENDIX A:  
The Welfare Effects of Monetary Unification 
The expected net welfare of monetary union for country i is given by: 
( )G G Gi i MU i AutonomyE NW EU EU≡ −                                                                                (A1a) 
This can be written as:  
)})](~[(
2
1{)})](~[(
2
1{ 2*,
2*
iiAutiiimu EE εππεππ −−−−−                                                      (A1b) 
Using, 2 2( ) [ ( )] ( )E Q E Q Var Q= + , we can rewrite (A1b) as: 
))}](~({
2
1})]](~[{[
2
1[ *2* imuimu
G
i VarENW εππεππ −−−−=            
))}](~({
2
1})]](~[{[
2
1[ *,
2*
, iautiiauti VarE εππεππ −−−−−                                                               (A2b)   
 
STOCHASTIC COMPONENT 
Net welfare for the stochastic component (SW) of (A2b) is given by: 
))}(~())(~({
2
1)( , iautiimui VarVarSWE εππεππ −−−−=                                                   (A3) 
Using the solutions for optimal inflation (3) and (5), we have: 
[ ] [ ]1( ) { ( ) ( ) }
2i A A i i
E SW Var bc Var bcπ ε π ε= − + − −% %                                                       (A4) 
Now, we can write the aggregate stochastic variable ∑∑
==
==
n
i
i
n
i
iiA ww
11
1,εε  as a weighted 
average of the supply shock to country i and the weighted average supply shocks of all other 
member countries excluding country i:  
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This gives 
1,
(1 ) ( ) (1 )
1
n
k
A i i i k i i i i
k k i i
ww w w w
w
ε ε ε ε ε−
= ≠
= + − = + −−∑                                    (A4a) 
Similarly we can write iiiiA cwcwc −−+= )1(                                                                (A4b) 
where i−ε  ( ic− ) is the weighted average of supply shocks (output preference) across the 1−n  
other union members. Thus writing the cross-country aggregate shock Aε  and the shocks to 
preferences Ac  as in (A4a) and (A4b), and assuming that the preferences and the supply shocks 
are not correlated we obtain:  
)],cov(2[
2
)1( 22
22
ii
i
i ii
wSW −−+−−= − εεσση εε
 [ ]),cov()1(2)1()1(
2
2222
2
iiiicici ccwwww
b
ii −−+−+−− −σσ                             (A5) 
 
NONSTOCHASTIC PART 
The non-stochastic part of the net welfare is given by: 
})]](~[[)]](~[{[
2
1)( 2*,
2*
iiautiiimui EENSWE εππεππ −−−−=                                             (A6) 
which reduces to: 
 }][]{[
2
}][]{[
2
1 22222
iAiA cc
bcbcb −−=−−                                                                                 (A6´) 
But 2***2* )]](~[[)]](~[[ iiimuimu EE εππππεππ −+−≡− . Let ii Acb ,π= and iiA cbcb ,πΔ=− . Hence 
we can write (A6) as: 
)}]{([
2
1 2
,
2
,, iii AA πππ −+Δ− ]}2{[2
1 2
,,, iiiA πππ Δ+Δ−=                                                      (A7) 
The net welfare for the non-stochastic part becomes:  
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[ ][ ] [ ] }()(2{
2
1 2
iAiAi ccbccbcb −+−− , which using (A4b) yields; 
[ ] [ ]2222
2
)1(
)1( ii
i
iiiii cc
wbcccbwNSW −−−−−−= −−                                                     (A8) 
Combining (A5) and (A8) yields equation (7) in the text. 
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TECHNICAL APPENDIX B:  
 
Deriving the estimates of parameters b and ic  
The policy maker is assumed to care about economic growth and inflation. The welfare function 
describing the policymaker’s preferences is given as in (2) in the text by; 
2
,,, )(~(2
1)~( tititiii yycW εππ −−−=                                                                                (B1) 
where ty  is the log of real output. Each period the policymaker plans to achieve a particular 
nominal growth rate dtxΔ ; 
xt
d
tt xx ε+Δ=Δ ,                                                                                                                (B2) 
Actual nominal output growth txΔ  may differ from the planned nominal output. As in Ball et al. 
(1988), we express the short-run output inflation trade-off as: 
ytttt xyty εαααα +Δ+++= − 41321                                                                         (B3) 
The log of the real GDP is regressed on its own lag, a time trend, and the change in the nominal 
GDP. Thus change in real output is given by; 
ytttt xyty εαααα +Δ+−++=Δ − 41321 )1(                                                                        (B4) 
The coefficient of the change in nominal demand ( 4α ) tells how much of a shock to nominal 
GDP shows up in output in the first year. If 14 =α , then all of the change in nominal GDP shows 
up in real GDP; and if  04 =α , then all the change in nominal GDP shows up in inflation. Since 
inflation is defined as ttt yx Δ−Δ=π , then the inflation rate can be written as; 
ttt hx −Δ−= )1( 4απ , where yttt yth εααα +−++= −1321 )1(                                         (B5) 
The policy maker optimizes (B1) with respect to dtxΔ , subject to (B2), (B4) and (B5) to yield: 
xt
e
ti
t
hcx εαα
α +−+−=Δ )1()1( 424
4 , where )()()1( 1321 ytt
e
t EyEth εααα +−++= −            (B6) 
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Equation (B6) expresses the policy maker’s reaction to the desired growth rate of real output 
and eth which represents the past development of real output growth. 
Following the two-step estimation procedure in Swank (1997), we first estimate the 
economic constraint (B3). From these estimates we calculate eth , which then allows us to 
estimate the reaction function of nominal demand (B6) with the coefficient on eth  constrained to 
be 
41
1
α− . The results from (B6) allow ic  to be calculated. This value allows us to estimate 
the ic , ic−  , and ),cov( ii cc − . 
In addition, from ttt yx Δ−Δ=π  and (B4) the value of b in (7) in the text can be 
approximated. By writing pΔ=π then from ttt yx Δ−Δ=π  we get: 
x
p
x
y
Δ
Δ−==Δ
Δ 14α                                                                                                              (B7)  
From (1) in text,
*πΔ
Δ
Δ
Δ= p
p
yb  where *π  is unexpected inflation. By appropriately rebasing 
prices we have 1
*
=Δ
Δ
π
p . Therefore we approximate b  from the following equation; 
4
4
1
1 α
α
−=−Δ
Δ=Δ
Δ=
p
x
p
yb                                                                                                   (B7′) 
Thus the value of b  can be estimated from (B7′). The weighted average of these values for the 
five East African countries is used as an estimate of the cross-country b value. 
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Table 1: Estimates of model parameters for East Africa  
 
Country Burundi Rwanda Kenya Tanzania Uganda 
b  0.194 0.191 0.099 0.133 0.098 
ic  0.559 1.288 1.161 3.1741 6.585 
2
ic
σ  0.0290 2.9211 0.1230 5.1977 19.0588 
2
iεσ  0.0017 0.03965 0.0005 0.0002 0.0002 
                                       
                                               Three-country union: Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda 
ic−     4.5085 3.3025 2.2164 
2
ic−σ     8.7337 3.0379 1.3030 
Cov ),( ii cc − ;   0.3428 3.1674 4.3030 
cρ    0.331 0.797 0.863 
2
i−εσ    0.0001 0.0003 0.0002 
Cov ),( ii −εε    0.0001 0.0001 0.00007 
ερ    0.415 0.345 0.029 
 
               Five-country union: Adding Burundi and Rwanda 
ic−   3.12 3.19 4.03 3.00 2.09 
2
ic−σ   2.6777 3.2147 5.8243 2.0018 0.8041 
Cov ),( ii cc − ;  -0.1423 -2.1298 0.2835 2.4106 3.4285 
cρ  -0.510 -0.695 0.335 0.747 0.876 
2
i−εσ  0.0004 0.0001 0.0005 0.0006 0.0006 
Cov ),( ii −εε ; 0.00002 0.0003 0.0001 0.0002 -0.0001 
ερ  0.029 0.121 0.271 0.515 -0.285 
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Table 2: Net welfare from monetary union in East Africa  
 
 GDP weights Equal weights 
 Three-country union: Kenya, Tanzania, and Ugandaa 
Kenya -0.095 -0.111 
Tanzania 0.010 0.010 
Uganda 0.380 0.348 
                      Five-country union: Adding Burundi and Rwandab 
Burundi  -0.107 -0.075 
Kenya  -0.093 -0.131 
Rwanda  -0.084 -0.057 
Tanzania   0.031 0.035 
Uganda   0.463  0.469 
a The weights are (0.392, 0.370, 0.238) for the three-country union respectively; b weights are (0.024, 
0.357, 0.067, 0.336, 0.216) for the five-country union respectively.   
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Table 3: Decomposing of the net welfare gain from monetary union in East Africa 
 
                   Preference shocks           Output shocks           Mean preferences  
     Three-country union: Kenya, Tanzania, and Ugandaa 
Kenya -0.0257                                -0.0008                      -0.0695 
Tanzania  0.0141                                -0.0001                      -0.0041 
Uganda  0.1228                                -0.0001                       0.2572 
                        Five-country union: Adding Burundi and Rwandab 
Burundi  -0.0231                                -0.0009                      -0.0829 
Kenya -0.0223                                -0.0002                      -0.0705 
Rwanda  0.0035                                 -0.0171                      -0.0707 
Tanzania  0.0243                                 -0.0001                       0.0064                           
Uganda  0.1514                                 -0.0003                       0.3122 
a The weights are (0.392, 0.370, 0.238) for the three-country union respectively; b weights are (0.024, 
0.357, 0.067, 0.336, 0.216) for the five-country union respectively.   
 
